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We investigate three aspects of the importance of nodes with respect to Susceptible-Infectious-Removed (SIR)
disease dynamics: influence maximization (the expected outbreak size given a set of seed nodes), the effect of
vaccination (how much deleting nodes would reduce the expected outbreak size) and sentinel surveillance (how
early an outbreak could be detected with sensors at a set of nodes). We calculate the exact expressions of these
quantities, as functions of the SIR parameters, for all connected graphs of three to seven nodes. We obtain
the smallest graphs where the optimal node sets are not overlapping. We find that: node separation is more
important than centrality for more than one active node, that vaccination and influence maximization are the
most different aspects of importance, and that the three aspects are more similar when the infection rate is low.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the central questions in theoretical epidemiol-
ogy [10, 15, 22] is to identify individuals that are impor-
tant for an infection to spread [17, 26]. What “important”
means depends on particular scenarios—what kind of disease
that spreads and what can be done about it. In the literature,
three major aspects of importance have been discussed. First,
the influence maximization problem is to identify the nodes
that, if being sources of the outbreak, would maximize the ex-
pected outbreak size Ω (the number of nodes infected at least
once) [14, 25]. Second, the vaccination problem is to find the
nodes that, if vaccinated (or, in practice, deleted from the net-
work), would reduce the expected outbreak size the most [26].
Third, the sentinel surveillance problem is to find the nodes
that are likely to get infected early [1, 4]. These three notions
of importance do not necessarily give the same answer to what
node is most important. In this work we investigate how the
ranking of important nodes for these three aspects differ and
why.
In this paper, we evaluate the three aspects of importance
with respect to the Susceptible-Infectious-Removed (SIR) dis-
ease spreading model [10, 15, 21, 22] on small connected
graphs (all connected graphs from three up to seven nodes).
The main reason we restrict ourselves to small graphs is that
it allows us to use symbolic algebra, and thus exact calcula-
tions [18]. In this way we can discover e.g. the smallest graph
where the three aspects of importance disagree what node is
most important; cf. Ref. [2]. Graphs of seven nodes are still,
we argue, large enough to see effects of distance.
Notwithstanding, large networks are important to study and
a possible future extension of this work. Ref. [24] studies
the difference between the influence maximization and vac-
cination problems on (some rather large) empirical networks.
They compare the top results of heuristic algorithms to iden-
tify influential single nodes, whereas in this paper we will con-
sider the influence of all nodes, and also all sets of two and
three nodes. (Ref. [24] uses a bit different terminology than
us—they call important nodes for vaccination “blockers” and
important nodes for influence maximization “spreaders”.)
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Illustration the three different notions of im-
portance we explore in this work. Panel (a) shows an example of an
SIR outbreak in a 7 node network. Panels (b)–(c) show the contribu-
tion of this outbreak to influence maximization (a), vaccination (b)
and sentinel surveillance respectively. The idea of influence maxi-
mization (b) is that a node is important if it outbreak originating at
it are expected to be large. The idea of vaccination (c) is that a node
is important if removing it would reduce the average outbreak size
much. The idea of sentinel surveillance (d) is that a node is important
if a sensor on it would detect the outbreak early. The shades of the
nodes in (c) and (d) is proportional to its contribution. In a stochastic
simulation, one would average the values over many runs and, for (c)
and (d), many seeds of the outbreak. In this work, however, rather
than running simulations, we calculate the exact expectation values
of these quantities.
We will proceed discussing our set up in greater detail—our
implementation of the SIR model, how to analyze the three
aspects of importance, network centrality measures that we
need for our analysis and our results including the smallest
networks where different nodes come out as most important.
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2II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give the background to our analysis. The
basis of our analysis are graphs G(V, E) consisting of N nodes
V and M links E.
A. Importance
As mentioned, there are three ways of thinking of impor-
tance in theoretical infectious disease epidemiology. Influence
maximization was first studied in computer science with viral
marketing in mind [14, 25]. As mentioned, a node is impor-
tant for influence maximization if it being a seed of an infec-
tion could cause a large outbreak. For epidemiological appli-
cations it could thus be interesting in case one can vaccinate
against a disease before an outbreak happens. We will simply
measure the expected outbreak size Ω(S ) (the expected num-
ber of nodes to catch the disease) with S as the set of source
nodes, and rank node set according to their Ω.
For vaccination, we will use the average outbreak size
from one random seed node to estimate the importance of a
node [3, 8, 15, 22]. One could, optionally, rephrase it as a cost
problem [12]. We assume the vaccinees are deleted from the
network before the outbreak starts. The node with smallest Ω
is the one most important for the vaccination problem.
The sentinel surveillance problem assumes a response after
the outbreak already started (compared to the influence max-
imization and vaccination problems where the intervention is
assumed to take place before the outbreak happens). A node
is important for sentinel surveillance if gets infected early so
that the health authorities can activate their countermeasures.
This is usually measured by the lead time—the expected dif-
ference between the time a sentinel node gets infected, or the
outbreaks dies out, and the infection time of any node in the
graph [4]. We will instead measure the average discovery time
time τ(i) from the beginning of the infection until a node i
gets infected or the outbreak dies [1]. The node with smallest
discovery time is then considered most important for sentinel
surveillance. If the purpose of the surveillance is just to dis-
cover the outbreak—not to free the population of the disease
as early as possible—one could measure τ(i) conditioned on
the outbreak reaching a sentinel before it dies out. We will
briefly discuss such a conditioned τ and refer to it as τ′.
For all of the three problems above, one can consider sets
of nodes rather than individuals. There can be more than one
source (for influence maximization), vaccinee or sentinel. We
will, in general, call these sets active nodes and denote the
number of them as n. We will try to find the optimal sets of
active nodes (and call them optimal nodes). Note that this is
not the same as ranking the nodes in order of importance and
take the n most important ones—such a “greedy” approach
can in many cases fail [8, 14].
Note that for the vaccination and sentinel surveillance prob-
lems, we use one source node of the infection. This is the
standard approach in infectious disease epidemiology sim-
ply because most outbreaks are thought to start with one per-
son [10, 11].
B. SIR model
We will use the constant infection and recovery-rate version
of the SIR model [11]. In this formulation, if a susceptible
node i is connected to an infectious node j, then i becomes in-
fected at a rate β. Infected nodes recover at a rate ν. Without
loss of generality, we can set ν = 1 (equivalently, this means
we are measuring time in units of 1/ν). Let C be a config-
uration (i.e. a specification of the state—S, I or R—of every
node); MS I the number of links between S and I nodes; and
NI the number of infected nodes. Then, the rate of events (ei-
ther infections or recoveries) is βMS I + NI which gives the
expected duration of C as
∆t =
1
βMS I + NI
. (1)
Proceeding in spirit of the Gillespie algorithm, the probability
of the next event being an infection event is βMS I∆t and the
probability of a recovery event is NI∆t [13, 22].
C. Exact calculations of Ω and τ
Exactly calculating the outbreak size and time to discov-
ery or extinction is, in principle, straightforward. Consider
the change from configuration C into C′ by an infection event
(changing node i from susceptible to infectious). This can
happen in mi ways, where mi is the number of links between i
and an infectious node. Thus the probability for the transition
from C to C′ is βmi∆t. The probability that the next event will
be a recovery event is simply ∆t. To compute the probability
of a chain of events one simply multiplies these probabilities
over all transitions. To compute the expected time for a chain
of events, one sums the ∆t for all configurations of the chain.
We will illustrate the description above with an example.
See Fig. 2. The probability of the outbreak chain 7 is (multiply
the probabilities of the transitions)
p7 =
β
2β + 1
× 1
2β + 2
× β
β + 1
=
β2
2(β + 1)2(2β + 1)
(2)
The expected duration of the infection chain is
τ7 =
1
2β + 1
+
1
2β + 2
+
1
β + 1
=
8β + 5
2(β + 1)(2β + 1)
, (3)
giving a contribution
p7τ7 =
8β3 + 5β2
4(β + 1)3(β + 2)2
(4)
of chain 7 to τ. Then these contributions needs to be summed
up for all chains, and averaged over all starting configurations.
For the example in Fig. 2, this gives
τ =
3β2 + 7β + 2
6β3 + 15β2 + 12β + 3
. (5)
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Illustration of how to calculate the expected
time τ to discovery or extinction in a small network with one sentinel.
The probabilities of transitions are marked on the links (with black
text). The expected time to stay in a configuration is next to the
configurations (in orange). The final states (where there are either no
infectious nodes or a sentinel is infected) are enumerated by boldface
numbers.
The expressions of Ω and τ are fractions of polynomials. For
the largest networks we study (seven nodes), these polynomi-
als can be of order up to 43 with up to 54 digit integer coeffi-
cients.
Calculating Ω for the influence maximization or vaccina-
tion problems follows the same path as the τ calculation
above. The difference is that instead of multiplying by the
expected time of a chain, one would multiply with the num-
ber of recovered nodes in that branch. Furthermore, there are
no sentinels to stop outbreaks, so trees (like Fig. 2) become
larger.
In practice, our approach to analyzing network epidemio-
logical models is time consuming. The major bottleneck is
the polynomial algebra (to be precise—calculating the great-
est common divisor, needed to reduce the fractions of polyno-
mials to their canonical form). Because of this, we could not
handle more than networks of seven nodes. The code was im-
plemented in both Python (with the SymPy library [20]) and
C with the FLINT library [9]. It also uses the subgraph iso-
morphism algorithm VF2 [5] as implemented in the igraph C
library [6]. Our code is available at http://github.com/pholme/
exact-importance, also including code to calculate τ′ (men-
tioned above but not investigated in the paper).
D. Centrality measures
To better understand how the network structure determines
what nodes are most important, we measure the average val-
ues of static importance predictors. In general, there can be
many ways of thinking of being central means for a node—is
it a node that things traveling over the network often passes, or
is it a node that have short paths to others, etc. Different ratio-
nales give different measures. These are typically positively
correlated, but does not rank the nodes in the exactly same
way, and can thus complement each other [16]. We focus on
three measures: degree, closeness centrality and vitality.
Degree centrality is simply the number of neighbors of a
node. If a node has twice the neighbors of another, it has twice
as many nodes to spread an infection to. This makes it more
important for influence maximization and vaccination. It also
has twice as many node to get the infections from, which con-
tributes to its importance for vaccination and sentinel surveil-
lance. On the other hand, degree is not a global quantity—it
could happen that the neighbors of a high-degree nodes are
so peripheral that a disease could easily die out there. The
simplest way of modifying degree to become a global mea-
sure is to operationalize the idea that a node is central if it is
neighbor of many central nodes. With the simplest possible
assumptions, this reasoning leads to eigenvector centrality—
that the centrality of node i can be estimated as i’th entry of
the leading eigenvector of the adjacency matrix [21]. For the
small graphs we consider, however, the eigenvector centrality
is so strongly correlated with degree (intuitively so, because
“everything is local” in a very small graph), so it makes little
sense to include it in the analysis.
Many centrality measures are based on shortest paths. Per-
haps the simplest being closeness centrality—using the idea
that a node is central if it is on average close to other
nodes [16, 21]. This leads to a measure of the centrality of
i as the reciprocal distance to all other nodes in the network:
c(i) =
N − 1∑
j,i d(i, j)
. (6)
The main problem, in general, with closeness centrality is per-
haps that it is ill-defined on disconnected graphs. In our work,
however, we consider only connected graphs.
We chose the third centrality measure—vitality—with the
vaccination problem in mind. Vitality is, in general, a class
of measures that estimates node centrality by its impact on the
network if it is deleted [16]. In our work, we let vitality denote
the particular metric
v(i) =
s(G) − 1
s(G \ {i}) (7)
where s(G) is the number of nodes in the largest component of
G. This measure is thus in the interval [1,N−1] and increases
with i’s ability of, if removed, fragmenting the network. Since
vaccination is, in practice, like removing nodes from the net-
work, we expect v to identify important nodes for β close to
one. For large graphs we expect v to be very close to one, so
we only recommend it for small graphs such as the ones we
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FIG. 3: (Color online) A small graph with special properties. It is the smallest graph where the three aspects of importance all have distinct
nodes as most important. For β in the interval [(1+
√
5)/2, (3+
√
17)/4] ≈ (1.62, 1.78), 6 is the most important node for influence maximization,
5 for vaccination and 1 for sentinel surveillance. The curves are color coded according to the graph to the left (with one curve and color per
automorphic equivalence class). The inset in panel (a) shows a zoomed and rotated view of some of the crossings of the curves (one of them
being the point where node 1 takes over from node 6 as the most important).
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FIG. 4: (Color online) A special graph for two active nodes. To the left, the colors highlight the automorphic equivalence classes. For β > 4.62,
{1, 2} are the most important source nodes (influence maximization) {5, 6} are the most important for vaccination and, finally, {3, 4} are the
most important for sentinel surveillance. The color bars indicate the most important node-pairs as a function of β, the curves are showing the β
dependence of the objective quantities Ω and τ. The four node combinations that are optimal at some β value for some scenario are highlighted,
others are gray.
use. Another popular centrality measure—betweenness cen-
trality (roughly how many shortest paths in the network that
passes a node) [21]—is very strongly correlated with vitality
for our set of small graphs, and thus omitted from the analysis.
E. Small distinct graphs
In our work, we systematically evaluate small distinct (non-
isomorphic) connected graphs. We use all such graphs with
3 ≤ N ≤ 7. There are two such graphs with N = 3, six with
N = 4, 20 with N = 5, 112 with N = 6 and 853 with N = 7.
To generate these, we use the program Geng [19].
III. RESULTS
In our analysis, we will focus one the question when and
why the three cases of node importance rank nodes differently.
We will start with some extreme examples and continue with
general properties of all small graphs.
A. Special cases
Inspired by Ref. [2], we will start with a special example
(Fig. 3). This is the smallest graph where the most important
single node (n = 1) is different for influence maximization,
vaccination and sentinel surveillance. For [(1 +
√
5)/2, (3 +√
17)/4] ≈ (1.62, 1.78), node 6 is the most important for in-
fluence maximization, 5 for vaccination and 1 for sentinel
surveillance. For small β-values, 6 is most important for all
three aspects of importance. In this region, the outbreaks die
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out easily. The fact that 5 and 6 have larger degree than the
others is, of course, helpful for an outbreak to take hold in the
population. 6 is slightly more important as a seed node since
the extra link in its neighborhood helps the outbreak to per-
sist longer (there are the (6, 7, 4) and (6, 4, 7) infection paths
that, although unlikely, does not exist for diseases starting at
5). This reasoning also explains why 6 is most important for
vaccination. For sentinel surveillance and for low enough β,
the outbreak would typically end by the outbreak becoming
extinct rather than hitting a sentinel. Thus, for low β, when
an outbreak has the highest chance of surviving if it starts at
6, then putting a sentinel is good because an outbreak is either
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FIG. 7: (Color online) The average distance between optimal nodes
when the number of active nodes are n = 2 (a) and 3 (b).
instantly discovered, or likely soon extinct. With a conditional
discovery time τ′, the curves are strictly decreasing (since the
early die-off is omitted) so 1 is the most important node for all
β.
For larger β, node 1 becomes, relatively speaking, more im-
portant for influence maximization and sentinel surveillance.
This is the most central node in many aspects other then de-
gree (it has the largest c and v values, but is also the most
central node in other ways not discussed here). For vaccina-
tion, however, node 5 is the most important as it fragments
the network most (the vitality is the same for both nodes
v(5) = v(1) = 2, but the size of the second biggest component
is larger if 1 is deleted). So since 1 becomes more important
than 6 at a larger β value for influence maximization com-
pared with sentinel surveillance, there is an interval of beta
where the network of Fig. 3 has three distinct most important
nodes for the three aspect of importance we investigate.
For two active nodes (n = 2), the smallest network with no
overlap between the optimal node sets is actually smaller than
for n = 1. This network, displayed in Fig. 4, has six nodes
and eight links. Note that N = 6 is the smallest number of
nodes to make three distinct sets of two nodes, so in that sense
the n = 2 example seems more extreme than the n = 1 one of
Fig. 3.
For large β values, 1 and 2 are the most important nodes for
influence maximization, 5 and 6 are most important for vac-
cination, 3 and 4 are most important for sentinel surveillance.
5 and 6 are the nodes that, if deleted, break the network into
smallest components, which explains why they are most im-
portant for vaccination (at least for large β). In addition to 5
and 6, 1 and 2 is the only pair of nodes whose neighborhoods
contain all other nodes. 1 and 2 have both degrees 3, as op-
posed to 5 and 6 that have degrees 4 and 2 respectively. If
and why that makes 1 and 2 better than 5 and 6 for influence
maximization is not clear. Similarly it is hard to reason about
why 3 and 4 are the best nodes for sentinel surveillance. The
neighborhoods of these nodes do not even contain the entire
graph.
We can see that the optimal sets of nodes in Fig. 4 do not
have links within themselves. This seems natural for most net-
works and all three notions of importance. This means that as
n grows, the distance between the optimal nodes will be larger
than one. This is an observation we will make more quantita-
tive in the next section. Another such observation is that for
small β the optimal nodes for the three importance aspects are
overlapping. In this parameter region, most outbreaks dies out
before they reach a sentinel. If the outbreak starts at a high-
degree node in a highly connected neighborhood, there is a
larger chance for it to survive. For all three importance as-
pects, it is important to have active nodes where an outbreak
would be likely to survive. Still, as evident from Fig. 4, there
are examples where the optimal nodes are not overlapping.
B. β-dependence
Now, we will move to a more statistic evaluation of all
graphs with 3 to 7 nodes. We will present average quantities
over all these graphs as functions of β. Other summary statis-
tics, including grouping the graphs according to size, give the
same conclusions.
Let ua,bi be the optimal sets for a given network, β and im-
portance classes a and b. The first quantity we look at is the
pairwise overlap of sets of optimal nodes as measured by the
Jaccard overlap
J(a, b) =
|Ua ∩ Ub|
|Ua ∪ Ub| (8)
where
Ua,b =
⋃
i
ua,bi . (9)
For example, in Fig. 4 at β = 2, we have:
ua1 = {1, 4} (10a)
ua2 = {2, 3} (10b)
ub1 = {3, 4}, (10c)
where a is influence maximization and b represents sentinel
surveillance, giving
J(a, b) =
|{1, 2, 3, 4} ∩ {3, 4}|
|{1, 2, 3, 4} ∪ {3, 4}| =
1
2
. (11)
We show the average Jaccard similarity between the differ-
ent aspects of importance in Fig. 5. The general trend is that
J decreases from an early maximum, i.e. the overlap between
the different aspects of importance is highest when β is small-
est. For n = 1, J is close to one in the limit of small β > 0.
(For β = 0, all node are equally important in all three senses
of importance.)
For n = 1, however, the overlap between the optimal nodes
for vaccination and sentinel surveillance has a minimum as
7functions of β. The same is true for sentinel surveillance ver-
sus influence maximization when n = 3. It is hard to say why,
more than that, for individual graphs, the J(a, b, β) curves
can of course be non-monotonous as different aspects of the
graph structure determine the role of the nodes. We note that
(for a different spreading model and much larger networks),
Ref. [24] finds the Jaccard similarity between influence maxi-
mization and vaccination to have a minimum as a function of
β.
C. Structural predictors
Next, we investigate the structural properties of the most
influential nodes and how they depend on β. In Fig. 6, we plot
the degree, closeness centrality and vitality as a function of β
for all aspects of importance and n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We start exam-
ining the case n = 1, Fig. 6(a), (b) and (c). A first thing to
notice is that the general impression is that centralities of the
optimal nodes decrease with β. The only case with an oppo-
site trend is vitality (Fig. 6(c)), where the curves are monoton-
ically increasing. If we first focus on the case with one active
node, this could be understood as the ability of nodes to (if
removed) fragment the network. This ability is captured by
vitality and becomes more important as β increases.
Continuing the analysis for n = 1, when β is low the most
important thing is for the outbreak to persist in the popula-
tion. If an active node has a high degree, it is likely to be the
source of a large outbreak, meaning it is important for influ-
ence maximization (which was also concluded by Ref. [24]).
If a high-degree node is deleted it would remove many links
that could spread the disease and thus be important for vac-
cination [23]. It would also be important not to put a sen-
tinel on a low-degree node for sentinel surveillance and low β
as diseases reaching low-degree nodes would be likely to die
out. So panels Fig. 6(a) and (c) can be understood as a shift
from nodes of high degree to nodes of high vitality. Closeness
centrality—seen in Fig. 6(b)—is harder to explain. Values of
c increases with β for influence maximization but decreases
for vaccination. One way of understanding this is from the
observation that vitality is most important for vaccination (as
evident from Fig. 6(c)), and degree is most important for in-
fluence maximization (as seen in Fig. 6(a)). The results of
Fig. 6(b) then suggests that the high vitality nodes optimizing
the solution of the vaccination problem have a lower closeness
centrality. Indeed, for many of the graphs we study, the high-
est vitality node has many degree-one neighbors—cf. node 5
in Fig. 3—which is not necessarily contributing to the close-
ness centrality. For influence maximization, it seems that the
optimal nodes are central in the closeness sense—the closer to
average the seed node is to the rest of the network, the higher
the chance is for the outbreak to reach all the network.
For n = 2 and 3, the picture is somewhat different than for
n = 1. In these cases, all centrality measures are monotoni-
cally decreasing. The order of the importance measures are all
the same with vaccination having the largest values, and influ-
ence maximization the smallest. It is no longer the case for
vaccination that the optimizing nodes have high vitality and
low closeness centrality (as it was for n = 1. Indeed, for the
vaccination case, the optimal nodes are usually independent of
β which is why the curves for vaccination in Fig. 3(d)–(i) are
almost straight. Naively, one would think that some centrality
measure needs to increase with β. However, as we will argue
further below, the optimal nodes would usually not be be close
to each other. One could think of each node being responsible
for (and centrally situated within) a region of the network, and
that that tendency is so strong that it overrides all simple cen-
trality measures. On the other hand, there are group centrality
measures that could perhaps increase with β [7] (that could be
a theme for another paper).
D. Distance between optimal nodes
The fact the all curves of Fig. 6(d)–(i) are non-increasing
could be explained by that the separation of the optimal nodes
increases with β. In Fig. 7, we try to make this argument more
quantitative by measuring the average (shortest path) distance
d between the optimal nodes. In the limit of small β, these
values comes rather close to its minimum of 1, but as β in-
creases, so does d. Essentially, the pattern from Fig. 7 is the
reversed of Fig. 6(d)–(i)—the vaccination curve is almost con-
stant, sentinel surveillance increases moderately but influence
maximization increases much more.
A larger separation gives the sentinels the ability to on av-
erage be closer to outbreaks anywhere in the network, while
for influence maximization a larger separation means that
there are more susceptible-infectious links (less infectious-
infectious links) in the incipient outbreak. For vaccination
there is no such positive effect of a larger separation that we
can think of, which is a part of the explanation why the opti-
mal sets are relatively independent of β for n > 1. The rest of
an explanation—why the trends for n = 1 are so much weaker
when n > 1 is not clear to us, and something we will investi-
gate further in the future.
IV. DISCUSSION
Furthermore, we investigated average properties of the op-
timal nodes for all our graphs. We found that the overlap be-
tween the optimal nodes of the different importance aspects
are largest for small β. In the small-β region, a high de-
gree seems most important for all importance aspects. For
larger β nodes positioned such that they would fragment the
network much if they were removed becomes more impor-
tant, in particular for the vaccination problem (slightly less
for the sentinel surveillance problem, and much less for influ-
ence maximization). When the number of active nodes, on the
other hand, increases, it becomes important for the nodes to
be spread out—the average distance between them increases.
This effect is large for influence maximization, intermediate
for sentinel surveillance, and very small for vaccination. The
small effect for vaccination can be understood since all that
matters is to fragment the network, and for that purpose the
vaccinees does not necessarily have to be distant.
8Most of the behavior discussed above seems quite natural.
For small β, the dominant aspect of the dynamics is how fast
an outbreak will die out. For large β, the outbreak will al-
most certainly reach all nodes. For vaccination and sentinel
surveillance, this leads to a question of deleting nodes that
would break the network into smallest components. (In the
former case, this is trivial since the size of the outbreak al-
most surely is the size of the connected component to which
the seed node belongs. In the latter, we conclude this from the
monotonically increasing vitality.)
To extend this work, it would be interesting to confirm
the picture pained above for larger networks using stochastic
simulations. This would not allow the discoveries of special
graphs such as those in Figs. 3 and 4, but could put the con-
nection between the different notions of centrality on a more
solid footing. We believe many of our conclusions hold for
larger networks, an indication being that our results are con-
sistent with the results of Ref. [24] (comparing the vaccination
and influence maximization for n = 1 in large empirical net-
works).
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